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CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
THE CARIBBEAN BASIN, ITS SUBREGIONS AND
THEIR INTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS
Hilbourne A. Watson*
INTRODUCTION
This study begins with the recognition of the historical note of
Caribbean Basin countries in the formation and development of
capitalism as a world system. In this regard, it locates them in the world
process of capital accumulation and contends that their historical, social
and economic dynamics can only be understood within the capitalist
context of the international division of labor. Beyond this it stresses the
importance of the forms of international economic specialization which
these countries came to adopt through the nondiscretionary framework of
mercantilism reproduced under "the imperialism of trade" (unequal
exchange) and the asymmetry of accumulation on a world scale.
The related analysis, therefore, proceeds from the following: an
identification and review of the contextual situation of the Caribbean
countries, focusing on the central assumptions of the development
strategy which was based on import-substitution industrialization. I will
also attempt to review aspects of the Caribbean Basin experience in the
areas of commodity, capital, technology and labor flow processes with an
emphasis being placed primarily on US-Caribbean Basin relations. The
analytical framework furthermore takes into consideration the similari-
ties and differences between the Basin countries and recognizes the
importance of the range of existing problems.
THE CONTEXTUAL SITUATION
The development of a world market for commodities was based on the
universalization and internationalization of commodity production.
Capitalism is the mode of production associated with commodity
production for the realization of surplus value based on private ownership
and control of the means of production. The Caribbean Basin countries
were integrated into this world capitalist system during the early
formative period on the basis of the international division of labor and
associated forms of international economic specialization that were
thrust upon them - production and export of primary agricultural and
industrial commodities on terms that led to the production and
* Associate Chairperson, Department of Political Science, Howard Univer-
sity, Washington, D.C.
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reproduction of structural economic dependence.' This situation is
reflected in the prevailing dominance of the external market over the
internal economic process. Profound negative consequences have resulted
in the economic, political and ideological spheres of life. This can be
appreciated through an analysis that takes into account the contradic-
tions expressed in the relationship between the domestic and interna-
tional dimensions: the relationship between production and consumption,
the general range of economic activity, unequal international exchange,
2
the formation of classes and forms of the class struggle, the national
question and the nation-state and the development of linkages within the
international system.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the "quality" terms of
trade for the developing countries (hereinafter referred to as the
periphery) began to decline and, generally speaking, from then onward,
there has been a tendency towards structural deterioration. This problem
was intensified by the imbalanced nature of the relationship between
commodity and capital flows and of the terms of participation in the
international division of labor. And they were all aggravated by the
isolation of the periphery from the world system of which it is an integral
part.
Despite these serious problems, the impact of the conditions of World
War I, the Great Depression and World War II had facilitated a shift
away from total Caribbean Basin dependence on the external market
towards a modest degree of import-substitution. This resulted from
decreased contact with imperial trade and capital links.
This tendency towards internal accumulation and industrialization
was expected to continue after World War II. The inherent tendency of
capitalism, however, is to expand markets and to export capital primarily
to counteract "the tendency of the rate of profit to fall." Therefore, after
World War II, and largely under American capitalist auspices, there was
a massive expansion and internationalization of capital which continues
to the present period. As a result of this situation and the imbalanced
mercantile relationships between Caribbean Basin countries, the United
States and other leading capitalist countries, the former economies have
been unable to solve the problems discussed above and those of
dependency and underdevelopment. 3
1. T. Dos SANTOS, The Structure of Dependence, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF DEVELPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 109-117 (1973).
2. A. EMMANUEL, UNEQUAL EXCHANGE: A STUDY IN THE IMPERIALISM OF
TRADE (1973).
3. The political legacy of this situation has been expressed in the class
struggle, the politicization of developmentalism, the tendency towards the
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The postwar period has also witnessed attempts by all of the
countries concerned to adopt development strategies designed to raise
capital and foster internal accumulation in response to the export of
surplus value, to promote exports in order to boost foreign exchange to
pay for expanding imports, to increase employment and to stimulate
economic activity in general. In the Commonwealth Caribbean the
strategy rested on the theoretical conceptions of W. Arthur Lewis and was
realized with the creation of industrial development corporations and the
accompanying legislation incentive provisions. 4 Nevertheless, it was the
widespread preoccupation of West Indian social scientists with the so-
called "plantation economy" model5 that prevented them - for intellec-
tual and "nationalist" ideological reasons - from employing the
appropriate focus on modes of production, socioeconomic formations and
class struggles, both in the study of underdevelopment in the Caribbean
social context and in prescribing appropriate alternatives to those
recommended by Lewis.
Mexico, Venezuela and other Latin countries have had a much longer
experience with import-substitution industrialization as is evident from
the fact that, by the time of the creation of LAFTA, most opportunities for
further action in that direction had already been exhausted. In Cuba, the
Dominican Republic and Haiti, the legacy of U.S. domination had
sufficiently conditioned the internal economic process to reproduce
virtually "pure" mercantile relations of exchange on the basis of
capitalist production relations. This severely limited the scope for
independent action.6 Cuba made a revolutionary break with the system in
1959. In the French Antilles and in the Netherland Antilles, a greater
degree of colonial mercantilism existed after World War II and continues
to this day; political ties with the mother country are stronger than those
with the United States. Puerto Rico has been dominated by the United
States in a colonial relationship and an active but dependent develop-
integration of the "technocratic," bureaucratic elite into the ranks of the ruling
class and the integration of labor leadership and the military elite into the political
component of the ruling class.
4. H. A. Watson, The Political Economy of Foreign Investment in the
Commonwealth Caribbean Since World War II 228-267 (1975) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Howard University, Washington, D.C.).
5. For example, G. BECKFORD, PERSISTENT POVERTY (1972). The works of N.
Girvan and 0. Jefferson should also be noted.
6. S. CASTOR, El Impacto de la Ocupaci6n Norteamericana en Haiti
(1915-1934) y en La Republica Dominicana (1916-1924), in POLITICA Y SOCIOLOGIA
EN HAITI Y LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA 42-64 (1974); A. D. SANTANA, Desarrollo y
Decomposicidn de la Economic Dominicana, in POLITICA Y SOCIOLOGIA EN HAITI Y
LA REPUBLICA DOMINICANA 109-1943 (1974).
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ment strategy. Panama and other Central American countries fell into
the grip of U.S. monopoly capital and, like other Caribbean Basin
countries, they continue to reflect the impact of imperialism on the
internal economic process in terms of commodity and capital flows and in
terms of their basic tendencies in international relations.
Foreign domination exists in the internal economic process of all
these countries. The emphasis is on those economic activities dependent
on imported capital and designed to raise the social productivity of labor,
thereby increasing the rate of exploitation of labor power. In this, the
state and labor bureaucracies of most of the countries have cooperated.
The higher the rate of exploitation of labor power, given a specific
production technology, the higher the rate of surplus value. These capital
intensive production activities, sponsored by these states under the wings
of the transnational corporations (TNCs), tend to be concentrated in
plantation export agriculture, mineral production activities, forms of
export-oriented manufacturing enterprises and the hotel sector. In the
manufacturing sector, where such capital-intensive methods are utilized,
production is generally limited to a small number of luxury and semi-
luxury goods that are destined for the petty bourgeois and petty
bourgeois-oriented elements. In other words, there has been created little
or no viable basis for the production of mass consumption goods. As a
result, opportunities for developing natural resources, producing adequate
levels of employment, boosting internally generated purchasing power,
developing appropriate technologies and formulating national economic
integration are foregone.
IMPORT-SUBSTITUTION INDUSTRIALIZATION: THE NEOCOLONIAL MODEL
The international situation during the early postwar period witnessed
the creation of the Bretton Woods system. Immediately, the contradiction
between imperialism and socialism assumed the form of the Cold War as
the national liberation revolution in the periphery reached new levels and
registered important successes. The intellectual climate in the dominant
bourgeois countries was characterized, in part, by the failure of social
science theory to treat the problems of so-called underdevelopment in a
scientific fashion.7 For example, economic theory ("economistic scien-
tism") continued to view economics as a science with a body of
"universally valid and testable theory" while subjectivist, neo-
7. A. G. FRANK, The Development of Underdevelopment, in DEPENDENCE AND
UNDERDEVELOPMENT 321-397 (1972); Bodenheimer, The Ideology of Developmen-
talism: American Political Science Paradigm-Surrogate for Latin American
Studies, BERKELEY J. Soc. (1972).
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marginalist theory remained preoccupied with questions of micro-
economics at the level of the firm and with problems of "allocative
efficiency." Reformist ideas, including anti-monopoly but pro-capitalist
liberal theory began to attract a following among intellectuals. During
the 1950s, ECLA began to provide an "explanation" of the nature and
structure of Latin America's political economy with an emphasis on the
international commodity and capital dimensions.
The argument raised by ECLA may be briefly summarized as
follows:8
1. There was no proof of a fundamental harmony of interests
between Latin America's economic reality and metropolitan capitalist
interests. This was a challenge to the principle of comparative advantage.
2. The available evidence revealed by trends in world trade for
developing countries in general since 1880 and between 1929-45 for Latin
America tended to contradict some of the main assumptions of
international trade theory - namely, perfect mobility of factors of
production and the accepted notion of direct correlation between the
growth of primary exports and national income (for a primary producer
and exporter).
3. There was not a lawful basis to the claim that the income
elasticity of demand for a country's imports and exports tends to remain
constant. In contrast, ECLA contended that the primary exports of the
periphery may grow and expand without a corresponding qualitative
increase in income.
4. In light of that general situation and of ECLA's response to the
assumptions of the theory of international trade, it was recommended
8. The point of departure was an attack on the theory of international trade.
It had begun to become evident that certain changes had been taking place in
trade and capital flows since around 1880: 1. The bulk of capital exported from old
centers of Europe went to new centers in the process of formation (U.S., South
Africa, etc.) and only a small portion went to the periphery as a whole; 2. This
export of capital was accompanied by a significant increase and expansion in the
export of goods (world trade grew from 3.3 percent in 1880 to 14 percent by 1913 to
correspond with the high level of capital exportation during the same period); 3.
The direction of the flow of capital and investment income between old and new
centers was different from that which took place between center and periphery,
with the latter exporting more surplus than it imports capital; 4. The gap between
wages and productivity in the periphery has been greater than it tended to be in
the center; and 5. The rate of profit tended to be higher in the periphery than in the
center. See AMIN, UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT: AN ESSAY ON THE SOCIAL FORMATION
OF PERIPHERAL CAPITALISM 161-62 (1976).
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that foreign exchange should be spent to promote import-substitution
industrialization rather than to promote the deepening of the primary
production and export process.9
A considerable amount of persuasive evidence was collected and
presented on behalf of import-substitution industrialization.10 The
intellectual foundation and the empirical basis of the "dependency
theory" was established by the early nationalist intellectuals." In many
ways the "new nationalism" of the anti-imperialist wing of the
"dependency school" has not advanced the original argument much
beyond the ideological thrust of its "intellectual precursors.'
2
The argument which ECLA presented on behalf of import-
substitution industrialization also isolated the following problems which
called for corrective measures as a prerequisite for successful implementa-
tion of the main elements of the program: a) Before there could be an
appropriate economic reorganization toward self-sufficiency in the
production of capital goods (for it was assumed that self-sufficiency was
realizable under capitalism and imperialism in the periphery), existing
demand which was being met by foreign imports would also have to be
satisfied by locally produced manufacturers; b) Foreign-oriented consu-
mer tastes would also have to be rehabilitated; and c) The state would
have to take action favoring the qualitative redistribution of income in
favor of the popular masses in order to promote and realize mass
consumption production, employment, use of local resources as inputs
and purchasing power sufficient to sustain the new thrust away from
structural dependence.
9. D. BOOTH, Andre Gunder Frank: An Introduction and Appreciation, in
BEYOND THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN LATIN
AMERICA AND AFRICA 55 (1975); Pinto & Knakal, The Center Periphery System
Twenty Years Later, Soc. ECON. STUD. 50-64 (1973).
10. A. G. FRANK, supra note 7, at 74-75; D. Booth, supra note 9, at 56.
11. Such intellectuals include, for example, Prebisch in Latin America and
Lewis in the Caribbean. See P. J. O'BRIEN, A Critique of Latin American Theories
of Dependency, in BEYOND THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMY AND
SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA 7-27 (1975); H. A. Watson, supra note 4, at
168-219; Girvan, The Development of Dependency Economics in the Caribbean
and Latin America: Review and Comparison, Soc. ECON. STUD. 22 (1973; Special
Number on Dependence and Underdevelopment); A. G. Frank, supra note 7, at
93-119; D. Booth, supra note 9, at 52-64; W. A. LEWIs, THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF
THE BRITISH WEST INDIES (1951).
12. O'Brien, supra note 11, at 7-20; I. OXAAL, The Dependency Economist as
Grassroots Politician in the Caribbean, in BEYOND THE SOCIOLOGY OF DE-
VELOPMENT (1975); H. A. Watson, supra note 4, at 606-36.
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The essential social interests represented by ECLA were, however,
basically bourgeois interests, and the model was not intended to consider
the feasibility of options outside of capitalism, in spite of its anti-
imperialist orientation.
As will be discussed shortly, the evidence against free trade
liberalism (or the case for protectionism) and the adoption of the
"alternative" strategy for development have not resulted in any
qualitative changes in the relationship between the center (developed
countries) and periphery in spite of claims of "dependent development."'13
In fact, the following points, which were identified by Prebisch and others
as evidence in support of import-substitution industrialization, continue
to plague those countries today in the form of problems of underdevelop-
ment and dependence:
1. The tendency towards deterioration of the terms of trade
stemming from a) income inelasticity of demand for primary exports and
the imperialism of trade; and b) secular increases in the prices of imports
from the metropolitan countries with which the periphery conducts the
bulk of its economic activities. 14
2. Chronic balance of payments problems related to and stemming
from trade imperialism, export of surplus value and the growing cost of
servicing the foreign debt.'5
3. Import rigidities reinforced by structural dependence on imports
including technology, capital goods, foodstuffs, other manufactures and
the general shortage of foreign exchange.
4. The relationship between the neocolonial state and imperialism: a
tendency towards subordination in foreign policy orientation, military
dependence, anti-communism and willing participation in the process of
control and leverage over the internal political economy such as may be
exercised by the World Bank, the IMF and other organizations. 16
Each attempt to solve the problem has yielded to further integration
into the world system and each attempt has facilitated the reproduction
of neomercantilist structures of trade and capital arrangements such as
LAFTA, CACM, CARICOM, the Andean Pact, SELA and other
governmental and economic systems. All of these strategies are
essentially forms of adjustment and adaptation to imperialism and to the
13. F. CARDOSO, IDEOLOGIAS DE LA BURGUESIA INDUSTRIAL EN SOCIEDADES
DEPENDIENTES: ARGENTINA Y BRASIL 60-94, 188-224 (1972).
14. A. EMMANUEL, supra note 2; A. G. FRANK, supra note 7, at 74-75.
15. Id.
16. T. HAYTER, AID AS IMPERIALISM (1971).
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conflicting requirements of capital accumulation on a world scale. We
must, therefore, be cautious about how we approach the questions of a)
the interest of Caribbean Basin countries by means of greater cooperation
among "member" countries; and b) U.S. interest in promoting such a
concept and "movement."
COMMODITY, CAPITAL AND LABOR DYNAMICS: 1970-76
The Empirical Context: Commodities
Caribbean Basin countries have spent more on imports than they
obtained from exports from 1970-76. Export earnings were realized
largely from primary commodities. The relatively large money values of
exports and imports of the Netherlands Antilles, Venezuela and Trinidad
and Tobago result mainly from the role of petroleum products in those
economies. These same countries, like the others, import most of their
food products, consumer durables and capital goods inputs. Therefore, we
cannot focus on the value of exports and imports in isolation from the
internal and international economic dynamics. All of this means that the
given money values are not important per se. It is the commodities, the
value contained in them and the alienation of surplus value that count.
Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela are the only countries in this group
to have registered a favorable balance of trade during the period. For all
of the countries, we must bear in mind that the money terms of trade are
basically misleading for they do not reflect the inflation problem and they
do not, in themselves, reveal anything about the process of unequal
exchange.17
In terms of trade, the United States maintained a favorable monetary
trade balance with Barbados, the French Antilles, Jamaica (except for
1976), the Leewards and Windwards, Haiti (except 1971 and 1976) and
Mexico during 1970-76. For the most part there was an unfavorable
balance of commodity trade with the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic,
Guyana (except 1975-76), the Netherlands Antilles, Surinam, Trinidad
and Tobago and Venezuela. Apart from Guyana and Surinam, the others
export large quantities of refined petroleum products to the United States.
This is particularly the case for the Bahamas. U.S. trade with Cuba
continued to be insignificant.
The general commodity situation can be visualized in broader terms.
Whereas the United States did not experience a very large surplus with
the Basin countries, its trade surplus with Mexico was significant and it
has come to dominate trade with most of these countries. Factors related
17. S. AMIN, supra note 8, at 161-62.
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to competition - proximity, competitiveness of U.S. prices, marketing,
delivery and quality - are identified in recent issues of the Foreign
Economic Trends (FETs) reports and the Overseas Business Reports
(OBRs) for all countries, upon which the following conclusions are based.
The Bahamas obtains over seventy percent of its imports from the U.S.
and in 1976, the U.S. became the major supplier of Barbados' imports for
the first time. Outside of Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic is the
single largest market for U.S. exports in the Caribbean and Central
America. The French Antilles and French Guyana trade primarily with
France (seventy percent) and the EEC (ten percent), while U.S. trade with
these territories is negligible. Guyana, Jamaica and Haiti also import
most of their requirements from the United States. Haiti currently
imports at least fifty percent of its requirements from the United States
while Trinidad and Tobago obtains approximately forty-five percent of
non-oil imports from the same source.
It is stressed that the Netherlands Antilles, with its strong foreign
"tastes" orientations, is a good small market for U.S. consumer imports.
The United States currently supplies over forty percent of Venezuela's
consumer imports and purchases about one-half of her non-oil exports but
experiences some competition from West Germany and Japan in the
import market.
Mexico has somewhat of a special position in the U.S. import-export
situation. In 1976, Mexico was the fourth largest export market for U.S.
goods ($4.9 billion) and the seventh largest supplier of commodities to the
United States.
The Dominican Republic relies most heavily on the U.S. import
market with an annual average of 71.4% followed by the Netherlands
Antilles (57.8%), Trinidad and Tobago (55.6%), Jamaica (45.6%), Venezu-
ela (39.6%), Surinam (37.6%) and Barbados (27.4%). Throughout the
period, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic registered the smallest
fluctuations while Barbados and Jamica showed the highest fluctuations.
The expansions gained by Trinidad and Tobago and the Netherlands
Antilles, starting in 1973, are mainly the result of the changes that
occurred in the international petroleum industry. These are among the
countries with the most favorable foreign exchange positions.
The Empirical Context: Capital Flows
(Foreign Investment)
Most of the commodities that are exported by Caribbean Basin
countries are produced by companies and plantations that are foreign-
owned and/or controlled. The export and import market pricing processes
also tend to show different degrees of manipulation and control by these
and other monopolies and oligopolies. Frequently, the direct contributions
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of these foreign corporations to the internal economic situation are
marginal18 and there may be no guarantee that the surplus value which
they accumulate will be converted into capital in these same countries.
On the whole, there is a high level of private overseas direct
investment (PODI) in the Basin countries. Venezuela, Mexico, British
West Indies, Panama, Netherlands Antilles, Trinidad and Tobago and
Jamaica lead with the greatest amounts of direct foreign investment.
These countries may be separated from all others in terms of volume of
investment and levels of concentration of investment in a limited number
of enterprises. Jamaica and Guyana are the only countries that
registered a decline in foreign investment at any time during the years
covered.
For all other countries there were reasonable to large increases in
PODI between 1967 and 1975. From 1967-71 there was an absolute
increase of $3,514.9 million or a 36.9% increase. Between 1971-72 the
volume of investment rose by $693 million (5.3%) and from 1973-75 there
was an absolute rise of $6,375 million (41.8%). For the period as a whole
the total increase was $12,087.9 million or 127%. At the end of 1967, the
U.S. share of PODI in these countries was $6,517.5 million (69.1%). Other
leading foreign investors in the region include British, Canadian, French
and Dutch firms which shared 30.9% of PODI by the end of 1967. Based
on the total population of the Basin countries, there tends to be high per
capita investment and, given the variations in population for each
country, there tends to be even higher per capita investment levels on a
country-by-country basis. This suggests that the level of foreign
investment per capita of population is high.
With regard to U.S. direct investment in selected countries for
1970-76, there are similar patterns of foreign capital concentration.
In spite of the adoption of nationalist public policies in Mexico and
Trinidad and Tobago, the level of U.S. investments has increased. The
decline of $216 million registered by Mexico in 1976 was modest. U.S.
investment in Guyana declined by about sixty percent from 1970-76, and
Jamaica registered a very modest decrease of $77 million in 1976. The
Bahamas, Bermuda, Dominican Republic and Panama all experienced
moderate to high increases in the volume of U.S. direct investments: the
increase from 1970-76 was 159.5% for the Bahamas; 134.9% for Bermuda;
63.1% for the Dominican Republic; and 64.3% for Panama. While the
increases by volume were quite modest for Barbados and Belize, the
French Caribbean and Haiti did not show any basic changes in U.S.
investments. For the countries as a whole, U.S. investments rose by
18. H. A. Watson, supra note 4, at 502-60.
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$5,670 million (79.5%) from 1970-76. Since the export of capital essentially
takes place to counteract "the tendency of the rate of profit to fall," one
can be assured that the basic tendency of foreign capital is to make a
higher rate of profit abroad than at home. The realization of a higher rate
of profit by U.S. capital invested in these countries suggests that a
considerably higher rate of surplus value may be realized and therefore, a
higher level of exploitation of labor power in high productivity and low
productivity industries. Unionized industries may experience a much
higher degree of class conflict than other industries that are not
unionized. The higher the productivity of labor in non-union industries,
the greater the tendency for capital to increase the degree of exploitation
of labor power.
The Empirical Context: The Export/Import of Labor
Theoretical literature on international migration (just now being
developed) views this process as an integral part of the international
division of labor. Literature that bears this orientation indicates that
there is a direct relationship between underdevelopment and the export of
labor from the periphery (neocolonies and other dependent countries) to
the center. In addition, this position holds that economies of the center
also import this labor in order to help satisfy labor requirements in
different sectors of the economy. 19 The tendency of most of the literature
on international migration has been to focus mainly on the so-called
"brain drain" 2 and to approach this aspect of the problem from the
perspective of neoclassical and post Keynesian synthesis. Such an
approach has generally failed to capture the meaning of process as it
relates to imperialism and underdevelopment.
Our concern with the export of labor to the United States by
Caribbean Basin countries stems from our perception of the problem of
underdevelopment which was set forth at the outset. Information
gathered from recent FET publications indicate that most of the countries
contained in the sample have experienced or are now experiencing
19. H. A. Watson, supra note 4, at 546-560; H. A. WATSON, International
Migration and the Political Economy of Underdevelopment: Aspects of the
Commonwealth Caribbean Situation, in CARIBBEAN IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED
STATES 16-43 (1976); E. Petras, Quantitative Migration: Thoughts on the Study of
Immigration Patterns with the Modern World Economy, and Some Alternative
Data Sources - Paper presented at the joint meeting of the International Studies
Association and the Smithsonian Institution Research Institute on Immigration
and Ethnic Studies, Washington, D.C., February 22-25, 1978.
20. H. MYINT, ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
238-252 (1971).
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unemployment rates of fifteen to twenty-five percent and when levels of
underemployment are considered, these rates may be as high as forty to
forty-five percent. While there is considerable variation in population, the
level of labor exports tends to be high due to the critical shortage of skills,
the shortage related to the problem of labor productivity and economic
development. Though the differences between professional, skilled,
semiskilled and unskilled labor are important, all categories must be
given a proper perspective because, as exported labor, they do reflect the
crisis of unemployment within underdevelopment.
The situation for 1970-76 found Mexico dominating the other large
labor exporting countries followed by the Dominican Republic, Jamaica,
Trinidad and Haiti. Guyana, Barbados and Panama are ahead of
Venezuela but far below the major exporters.
For our purposes, labor may be categorized as professional, techni-
cal and kindred (PTK) workers to housewives, children and others.
The United States imported about 19,799 PTK workers over the seven
year period. Included among labor in the PTK category are doctors,
engineers, architects, scientists, nurses, lawyers and other high productiv-
ity "professionals." Other categories vary in terms of training and
productivity. However, productivity must be seen within the context of
the prevailing technology of production which results from and reflects
the level of development of productive forces in the center and in the
periphery. The export of skilled labor from these countries to the United
States means that the labor-importing economy obtains benefits from
labor resources it did not necessarily train. It is a kind of technology
transfer by the labor exporting country.2 The benefits foregone and
shouldered by the labor exporting economy are reflected at three levels: a)
the direct social costs of training this labor, assuming it was trained at
home; b) the social and economic consequences of the depletion of its
limied skilled resources; and c) its contribution to the labor importing
economy.
The Caribbean Basin countries, like many others in the periphery,
have experienced deteriorating terms of trade, foreign capital domination,
external indebtedness and high levels of outflow of surplus value. At the
same time there are high inflow levels of investment capital. As this
capital is brought in, profits and labor are exported. The export of profits
and labor are part of the "mechanism of transformation" which any
economy requires for development. It is ironic that these economies could
have higher levels of unemployment if this labor were not exported since
this labor is important to the development of a more skilled labor force.
21. K. KABRA, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE BRAIN DRAIN 114-36 (1976).
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
But it has no employment outlets at home; it is exported to alleviate the
unemployment crisis and to boost productivity and fill needs in the labor
importing economy.
When labor is exported, it aggravates the already serious problem of
limited skills in the economy. The contradiction is simply that the export
of labor results from underdevelopment which is intensified by the export
of labor that is required to facilitate a rise in productivity and the
advancement of development. All of this takes place in the face of fairly
active perverse growth - development of underdevelopment. The reality
is that attempts to diversify production and exports; efforts to industrial-
ize for national economic development via the import-substitution
industrialization approach; and via strategies such as regional economic
integration (LAFTA, CARICOM, etc.) have been largely unsuccessful.
Massive unemployment prevails, denationalization has reached new
levels in some countries and investment in import-substitutioned
industries and further capitalization of raw material ventures have come
primarily through PODI. The result has been further integration into
international capitalism.
U.S. INTERESTS
The Carter Administration appears to be in favor of what has come to
be called "ideological pluralism" in the Caribbean. This policy has found
support in liberal quarters which stress that there may be useful lessons
to learn from Cuba's experience. Support for a degree of "ideological
pluralism" in official and unofficial U.S. political circles reflects an
adjustment in those circles to the imperialism-socialism contradiction.
There is no serious scholarly position or analysis on the Caribbean that
does not see Cuba at the center of this "new" policy orientation. If world
realities are considered, one is left with the impression that there is little
that is "new" about this policy in any substantive context. The United
States is more concerned with fundamental changes in the mode of
production and class character of the state in Guyana, Jamaica, the
Bahamas, Surinam and Mexico than it is about developments bearing
upon state participation in, or control of, the means of production. In the
latter respect, Cuba is the exception but this does not mean that
''unconventional" politics in the region does not concern the United
States.
In order to pursue these points, we may look at U.S. Department of
State perceptions of developments in Caribbean Basin countries from the
angle of U.S. economic interests. First of all, those countries with a fairly
high level of industrialization and which have a considerable foreign
exchange and/or the ability to obtain funds for capital formation and
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expansion are on top in terms of U.S. economic expectations. These
countries include Mexico, Venezuela, and Trinidad and Tobago. All three
are looked upon as having sound investment climates. The massive
capitalization programs of Venezuela - valued, according to the 1977
FETs, at $9.3 billion for 1976-80 - along with those of Mexico and
Trinidad and Tobago provide excellent opportunities for U.S. exports and
investments over the next five to ten years and beyond. The Dominican
Republic, according to the 1975 FETs, is viewed as a country with a
"stable political climate" where cheap labor abounds. The United States
does not expect to lose any of its market share in Guyana and Jamaica;
import reduction has resulted from the foreign exchange crises and has
little to do with the ideological thrust of these countries.
Barbados is seen as a good investment risk even if on a small scale,
and the Netherlands Antilles are a reliable market for U.S. goods. It is
not. anticipated that state policies which stress economic nationalism in
Surinam and the Bahamas will weaken the U.S. trade or investment
position in these economies. In particular, with respect to the Bahamas, it
is noted that "the major political parties are committed to principles
which foster the environment needed for economic growth, investor
confidence and political stability. '22 All other countries, with what
appears to be a radical thrust, want to offer similar guarantees. While
Haiti does not show any signs of measurable economic growth, it is still
viewed as likely to attract some offshore light industries on account of its
cheap labor that is currently being bought at an average of $1.60 per day.
Recent moves toward coordination of "regional" policies by capital-
ists and capitalist states are also instructive. "Ideological pluralism"
incorporates policies for closer interaction designed to forestall, wherever
and whenever possible, a fundamental and critical shift to the "left." It is
understood that such a shift is not impossible and since the United States
does not continue to view its "interests" in the Caribbean within the
classical cold war "zero-sum" framework, it has had to consider and
support alternatives - namely, private sector organizations within the
region made up of local and foreign capitalists; closer coordination of
policies and strategies by bilateral aid donors as well as by multilateral
bodies including international financial institutions (e.g., IMF, IBRD,
IDB); and support for intraregional multilateralism spearheaded by
countries such as Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela with possible
Brazilian involvement. This capital bearing "pragmatism," it is hoped,
would serve to counteract Cuban influence in the Caribbean. It seems
22. Foreign Economic Trends and their Implications for the United States
(FET), The Bahamas 77-064, Department of Commerce (1977).
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clear to the United States that Cuba's objective legitimacy in the region
cannot be undermined any longer and this represents a real problem for
imperialism.
The context in which the United States pursues its broad economic,
political and strategic interest in the region continues to change. For
example, matters as basic as human rights and the democratization of
international relations are being defined by a range of countries,
including small countries. Cuba, Guyana and Jamaica are among the
small countries that are influencing these definitions and perceptions in
the region.
In the final analysis, the United States should be expected to pursue
its policy interests in the Caribbean according to strategies which will
work with respective groups of countries - namely, Mexico, Panama and
Venezuela in one respect, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Grenada in
another respect, and those Commonwealth Caribbean countries where the
short honeymoon of postwar "liberal" democracy is quickly coming to an
end. The latter countries have few options. In spite of "acceptance" of
ideological pluralism, the barometer of U.S. support is, without a doubt,
the dynamics of anti-imperialism and the national liberation revolution
in the Caribbean.
CARIBBEAN ALTERNATIVES: IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION
We have seen that import-substitution industrialization has failed to
produce expected results. Regional economic integration strategies that
begin with promotion of "trade creation" objectives among peripheral
economies that are highly integrated into the world system have also
failed. The degree of economic nationalism that forms such a regional
trust may conceal the real contradictions. On the other hand, the impact
of the world crisis may accelerate the destruction of weaker structures or
the dynamics of international capitalist integration may lead to a
sufficiently high level of denationalization that reproduces stagnation.
State ownership and/or control of the means of production does not
necessarily constitute an alternative. The region appears to be playing
out its options within the model as the crisis sharpens.
What, then, are the alternatives? In each country the political ruling
class and economic sectors are interested in strengthening their
respective positions within a rapidly shrinking area of discretionary
social action. Mexico, Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago have been
attempting to develop export markets in the region. Trinidad and Tobago
has seen CARICOM as its market, largely because it has had no luck
penetrating metropolitan markets with its non-oil manufactures that are
produced by foreign corporations. Under the auspices of the state and
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foreign capital, Trinidad and Tobago seek to control the CARICOM
market. Jamaica will not sit and watch out this play of forces. Internal
and international economic crises force Jamaica and Guyana to adopt
austere measures that have a negative impact on the export market of
Trinidadian capitalists, both state and private. Guyana needs the
regional market for its rice exports, while Jamaica hopes its manufac-
tures will catch on in the Eastern Caribbean. Eric Williams' attempt to
make Trinidad and Tobago the successful capitalist model in the
Caribbean has come under pressure from developments in Guyana and
Jamaica and from "new" relations between Mexico, Venezuela and
Jamaica.
There are other serious issues - the problem of Cuba's role in the
hemisphere, the independence of Puerto Rico, the constitutional status of
the Netherlands Antilles, the question of the autonomy of French
Caribbean dependencies 23 as well as the British Caribbean dependencies,
associated states (LDCs) and all other territories in the region, including
the U.S. Virgin Islands. On all of these questions, it has been suggested
that the critical factor is one of power. 24 In order to set the conditions for
realizing this "power," the prevailing mercantilist and neomercantilist
arrangements must be terminated. To do this, the entire region must be
mobilized, not on the basis of some new version of the discredited strategy
of the 1960s that reproduced neocolonialism, but according to a new
strategy that is Pan-Caribbean in orientation.25 Such a strategy does not
and cannot rest on acceptance of "ideological pluralism," though the
extent to which "ideological pluralism" may pertain can be helpful in the
interim. It calls for a break with imperialism and requires unqualified
support for the unconditional independence of Puerto Rico - a
nonnegotiable issue. Repressive regimes must be isolated but their
isolation must be seen in terms of their termination. All military bases in
the region would have to be removed, all the way from Guantanamo to
Barbados. Economic survival would require a strategy of self-reliance
based on rationally conceived cooperation that would be capable of
thinking through the basis of appropriate technologies within a mode of
economic organization that puts the working class first.
There are other basic problems such as how to deal with raw material
resources, including oil production and processing, bauxite and sugar.
Other issues that affect intraregional transport, population, regional
planning and development have to be tackled. Immediate problems of
23. Caribbean Contact, February 1978, at 2; Id., March 1978, at 3.
24. L. Best, The Fixture of CARICOM, Lecture presented at the Latin
American Roundtable Seminar, Institute for Policy Studies (1978).
25. Id.
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 213
regime ideological diversity, from liberalism to neofascism, are massive
and the questions of short-term and medium-range options for the
immediate future must also be considered. Questions of "race," national-
ism and others that bear on territorial (border) disputes between Guyana,
Venezuela and Surinam and between Belize and Guatemala are likely to
persist. There is also the question of subimperialism which Trinidad
continues to identify.
At present the United States should not be expected to contribute to
the resolution of these problems. It is not even likely that the scale we
envisage will be feasible now or in the medium-range outlook. Yet, there
are general regional problems with economic, political and other social
dimensions. The preconditions of their resolution rest on weakening the
ties of dependence with imperialism. It is logical to reason that, since the
integration of these countries into the world capitalist system has been
central to the production and reproduction of this situation, disengage-
ment from that system is necessary for the resolution of the contradic-
tions that have been produced.

